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outside of this confusion, kept deliber-
ately otit by the poetic cadence and ele-
vation of the writing, as in the follow-
ing conclusion to the chapter called
"Brotbel":
And still the vision of that young woman
drifted there, vague one moment, the next
vivid, reaching lor me. tinioosing the clasp
of her skirl ihat rustled down ;i.s I leapt back
and came forward, bltinin^ inwardly, mak-
ing my election.
More important than the boy's per-
spective is his working<'lass background,
bowever little Deane wishes to make
it an issue. There are, in this world,
few places to hide from the indignities
that the boy comes to expect. I he occa-
sional beatings or taunts administered
by local policemen are matched by the
assatilts of street gangs and the bruising
insults of olliers alert to every prospect
of inflicting abuse. Clrowing tip among
unsophisticated persons nursing their
own memories of want and htirt. the
boy has little chance of escaping the
vindictive parochialism of his commti-
nity. Sometimes, in Deane's world, it
seems that the worst thing a decent per-
son can do is to talk to a policeman, as if
to do so were to sell one's soul to the
devil.
A s in other Irish works fo-cused on betrayal, the cen-tral term in the lexicon ofabuse here is "informer."
To inform is to forfeit any semblance of
self-respect and to sever irreparably one's
ties to the community. Forgivable in prin-
ciple, the informer is in practice re-
garded as grotesque and out of botmds.
Hiien the father titters, abotit a member
of his own family, the words "he was an
informer," the son can only beg him to
unsay tbem. "Say notbing," he repeats to
himself. "Never say. Never say." Members
of families thought to have contained an
informer are tainted, carry a ctirse and
may expect at any time to be piuiished
for the unhappiness that has befallen
tbem. To marry into such a family is not
only ill-ad\'ised. it is a breaking of "sacred
laws."
Like everything else in Deane s world,
bis people may regret certain attitudes
and practices regarding informers, but
the attitudes are too deeply rooted to
deplore or to reform. When the lioy
finds himself suspected of informing on
a few street totighs wlio had intended to
rough bim up, he fuids no support, even
within his own family. Never mind that
he gave no information to the police-
men who questioned him. Never mind
that no movement or organization was
at stake, no oath violated. "Have yoti
no self-respect, no pride?" screams his
mother.
""I'hank Clod my father's too ill to hear
abotit this—the shame itlone wotikl llnish
him. Agiandsoii olhis going to Ihe police!"
"1 didn't go lo the police. I threw a stone at
them."
"Same ihing in iht- rin umstitnces "
Nor is the tistially more generous
father more tinderstanding, "Wliy didn't
I take a few punches... ? Didn't I know
what sort of people the police were? Had
I no guts, no sense, no sany, no shame?"
IcTnpted to nuirk tip the entire demand-
system of the community to "sttipidit),"
the boy concludes tbat his father and all
the others are "right" but "wrong too."
To live in stich a place, it seems, is to
accept that wisdom consists in learning
to tolerate what in any case will not
change. If it is stupid to be baltered for
no good reason, and stupid lo regard as
"informing" what is no such thing, and
stupid to live perpeinally in fear of disap-
proval b\' persons who are ignorant and
maliciotts, it is also stupid to pretend that
one can get along in stich a place with-
out making substantial concessions to
the reigning shibboleths and expecta-
tions.
Of cotirse, Reading in the Dark is a
novel, Wiiat would seem contradiction in
another genre is here variousness and
complexity. Deane need not tell us that
he disapproves of much that passes for
the facts of life in Derry for us to grasp
their awftilness and their sometimes ter-
rible vitality. And, for all the stubborn
blindness in many of Deane's characters,
there is a tenacity' that ean seem almost
wonderful. The sittiation of Northern
Ireland, discernible here onlv in frag-
ments, allows for a complicated commu-
nal life, however crippling its myths.
Deane's novel is driven by au impressive
power of remembrance, and by a convic-
tion that the proper btisiness of the nov-
elist is to make ordinary lives in their own
way eveniful, so that possibility exists
even where fatality reigns.
RoBKRT B()\ER.s is Tisch Professor of Arts
and Letters at Skidniore College and edi-
tor of Salmagundi.
The global economy and American wages.
Fear Not
BY JAGDISH BHAGWATI
A re we in the midst of a vim-lent form of mutant capi-talism, prompted by thespread of markets and the
arrival of the global economy, that per-
manently imperils the earnings of otir
blue-collar workers, accentuates econom-
ic inscciuity among white-collar work-
ers, undermines our sense of personal
identity and atitonomy, endangers oiu"
democracy and is tishering in a dark and
unprecedented era that ie(]uiies us to
retliink the economic and social insti-
tutions of a vanishing age? Or are we ex-
periencing only tiansilory difficulty and
distress, whose magnitude is exaggerated
by tbe media, witb the consequence that
pessimistic perceptions have overtaken
optimistic realities?
file ttig of war between these views is
momentous in its conseqtiences. If the
J.\<i[)isn BnAGWATl's new book, A Sirmm
afWiiuhnos: I'nseltlingRejleclions un Trade,
Immigration and Democracy, will be pub-
lished by MIT Press this year.
dismal view is correct, and we stand aside
as silent witnesses to an tmfblding his-
tory whose import we fail to grasp, we
may unleash chaotic responses by the dis-
tressed in oiu" society, who will be denied
a significant and appropriate response to
their predicament. And if we rush in to
fix what isn't broken, and wind up deny-
ing oiuselves the undoubted economic
benefits of markets and participation in
tbe global economy, we would be com-
mitting an tinforced economic error and
damaging otirselves and otir prospects.
Iniellecttials prosper, of course, by
proclaiming new ages and new epocbs.
And the celebrity of intellectuals is im-
mune to the tests of time and leftitation.
Just ask yourself: Where did "the affluent
society" go? It was here to stay, in John
Kenneth Galbraith's famous analysis,
tbougb it needed repair. And wbat ever
happened to the arrival of "technostruc-
ttire" and the new eia of the long man-
agerial \'iew in corporate planning and
of permanent jobs, annotinced again by
Cialbraitb? Indeed, with many today
lamenting tbe crippling dominance of
shareholders bent on "short-iermism."
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and many others blasting "downsizing"
as a low road that is undermining jobs,
the proponents of the epoch of "tech-
nostructure" and "managerial capital-
ism" have surely lost to the serious
scholars who scoffed at them.
And intellectuals tend to prefer pes-
simism. Recall the "declinism" that
.swept through tbe United States in the
1980s—and contrast it to our relative
pi osperity today as Japan, once feared as
t)ninipotent and touted as a role model
by many, is now seen in its distress as
having joined the human race after all.
And as Europe, with its low growth rates
and high unemployment rates, has be-
come in its entirety the sick man of Eur-
(tpe, the sick man that is Europe, where
might Lester Thurow hide his confident
prediction of 1992 that, of the three
economic giants today, Europe wotild
emerge the "winner?" No lesser calamity
has overtaken his famous declaration
that "(iAli is dead," a diagnosis that was
especially egregious when he made it in
Davos at the World Economic Forum:
even as he spoke, C;ATT was being be-
sieged by lobbyists wanting to include
their catises on its agenda while non-
member nations were qneuing up to
join. And yet the reptitations of these
prophets are intact.
A nd things are not easy, con-versely, for those who meetthe apocalyptics and thetheorists of the new age
with skepticism. They sound callous at
worst, and silly at best, if they question
the strength of the economic phenom-
ena that are so "obviotisly" defining and
distressing the new epoch. The skep-
tics defy the fashions also in fields far
from economics, in political theory, phi-
losophy, international relations and so-
ciology, where the assumption increas-
ingly grows tbat we are now at a ttirning
[)oint in history, in which capitalism
bas produced a variety of grim to catas-
trophic conseqtiences. There is an essen-
tial connection, we hear, between a lost
sense of personal identity and a new
anguish about economic prospects, be-
tween downsizing and bowling alone.
1 he Clobal Age is seen even as a threat
to democracy itself. We are warned that
forces beyond democratic control are
dominating economic life. Ralph Nader
and others insist that international in-
stitutions are constraining and overturn-
ing the gains that grass-roots politics
made on environmental and health
issues: thus C.ATT. a creature of multina-
tionals that have been routed in battles
at the local level, devises agreements
behind NtiO backs that win the war for
the corporaticjiis in an end-run around
democracy.
So what is really going on? Three ques-
tions are begged by all this tumult. Is
there really increased distress? If so, what
is producing it? And what can we do
abottt it?
n.
T he different elements ofdisttess need to be unbun-dled. Two main phenom-ena are now thotight widely
to be afflicting the economic world. On
the one hand, the real wages of unskilled
blue<o!lar labor appear to have declined
throtigh the 198()s and done not much
better in the 1990s. On the other hand,
the educated white-collar workers are
considered to be vulnerable to job losses
to an unprecedented degree. What are
the facts?
The evidence for the decline in the
wages of otu' unskilled, the bitie-collar
workers, is fairly robust. True, they have
falleti less than we thotight they would
fall, when adjustment are made for the
recent revision in the Consumer Price In-
Tlie (rijod Life and Its Discontents:
The Ammcan Dream in the
Age oJEnlightemnent 1945-1995
by Robert J. Samuelson
(Times Books, 293 pp., $25)
The End of Affluence:
The Causes and Consequences
of America's Economic Dilemma
by Jeffrey Madrick
(Random House, 223 pp., $22)
America Unequal
by Sheldon Dan/iger and Pcier (lottschalk
{Harvartl University Press, 22" pp.. |!r>.9.^ paper)
dex and for fringe benefits; but they have
fallen nonetheless. And, whatever has
caused our real wages to fall during tbe
1980s, and virtually to stagnate through
most of the 1990s, appears to have ob-
tained equally in Etirope, adding to the
high levels of unemployment there, since
their labor markets are more "inflexible"
than ours.
The decline in real wages in the
United States, moreover, has occtirred
against the backdtop of a rise in income
inequality and wealth ineqtiality, well
documented by Ed Wolff oi New York
University and paralleled by studies for
several other developed countries. The
most recent estimates of income disparity
in the United States, jtist released by
the Onsus Bureau, suggest that the gap
between the incomes of the rich and the
poor, variotisly defined, bas increased in
the last qtiarter centttry, and most likely
faster dtiring the (Hinton years. And yet
this is not necessarily an explosive social
sittiation, thotigh it may offend egalitar-
ian sensibilities.
WTiat does matter is the coexistence of
fallen and stagnant real wages at the
bottom of the heap with conspicuous
consumption at the top. with sttbstan-
tial remtuieration of management (es-
pecially a downsizing management) at
the workplace itself and with the sense
that upward mobility is more and more
rare. As Simon Schama has reminded
us, the embarrassment of riches among
the Dtitch burghers provided capitalism
with a htiman face: the btnghers pur-
sued wealth, creating prosperitv\ but the
wealth was not spent on personal self-
indulgence. It is hard to imagine any-
thing resembling the spirit of Calvinism
or Puritanism defining the lives that are
described in tbe st\le sections of otir
newspapers.
I suspect tbat the new visual technolo-
gies that bring the lavish consumption
of the rich and the super-rich into our
homes do not merely satisfy vicarious
appetites. For the many who have been
experiencing economic diffictilties even
as the economy has continued to grow,
our culture of spectacle feeds frustration
and resentment instead. It is the sense
that you cannot improve your station,
that you cannot get at the higher in-
come, consumption, and wealth that you
see others enjoy, that is the tiltimate
pro!)lem, sinee it tmdermines the uniqtie
basis of American capitalism. (Capitalism
survives best when it encourages accu-
mulation and restraint, and also an abun-
dance of altrtiism; or when, despite un-
equal outcomes, it offers tbe equality of
opportunity' that we call, sentimentally
but appropriately, the American Dream.
I n recent years, the impressionhas become widespread thatone's probability of getting upto a higher rung of tbe in-
come ladder has declined. And this feel-
ing of futility, thotigh it is exaggerated, is
not entirely otit of line when checked
against the statistics. Peter Gottsclialk—
who, with Sheldon Danziger, has writ-
ten a careful analysis of poverty and in-
eqtiality in tbe United States—argued
recently that, of the five contemporary
sttidies of earnings and income mobility
in the L'nited States, using longitudinal
data that trace incomes over time, two
suggest that the trend is down, while
three indicate tbat there is no trend. In
none of the studies, bowever. is there any
indication of improved upward mobility,
of an increa.se in income level that wotild
soften the blow from stagnant wages.
But if all this is dismal, it is not the
whole picttire. There are countervailing
developments that sbotild bar tis from
despair. For a start, the media, for which
bad news is good news, often overplays
tbe notions that good jobs are di.sappear-
ing, that the new service-sector jobs
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doom us to a destiny of hamburger flip-
pers, that we are now "overworked"
^Vmericans making two ends meet by
holding down tlirec jobs. The Council of
Economic Advisers, in a liiief but incisive
study that was held hack for some time
as the administration's political advisers
confronted the obvious diffictilty in rec-
onciling Clinton's desire to feel Ameri-
can pain with Clinton's desirt- to show
resnlts, has dealt a mortal blow to these
ideas. In particular, the report .shows that
the vast majority of net new jobs—that is,
the jobs produced minus the jobs de-
stroyed—created during the early 19y0s
are ftiil-tiiiie rather than part-time, that
nearly two-thirds of the jobs created be-
tween February 1994 and February 199fi
were in sectors and occtipations that paid
above-average wages and that the share
of workers holding multiple jobs has
remained approximately constant since
the late 1980s.
Moreover, we know from the work of
the labor economist Henry Farber that
people who arc permanently displaced,
including those raiigbt up in the infa-
mous downsizing at big corporations,
are not facing a bleaker prospect of
finding a new job now than in the early
1980s (thotigh we should not forget that
those were less prosperous years). The
wrenching stories of the downsized man-
agers wbo wound up bagginj^ jrroceries
or deliverint^ liquor to their neighbors
have no counterpart in statistical reality:
the average reduction in waj^ es earned
during 1981 to 1993 by the displaced was
a sad, btit not devastating, 14 percent.
T o understand at a deeperlevel why the ptiblic hasnonetheless fallen preyto overblown com[)laints
about the vanishing American Dream,
we could do no better thau read Rob-
ert Samtielson's shrewd and optimistic
book. It combines fust rate economic
analysis with persuasive liistorical, politi-
cal and sociological insights. Samuelson,
too, destroys some gloomy stereotypes,
among tbe more melodramatic being
that, as Juliet Schor argued in her inucli-
cited book The Chierworked Ammcari
(1991 )^, the American worker today is
overworked and overstressed. Samuel-
son cites data Irom a later study that
show that this conclusion was "simply
wrong," because "women work more on
jobs, but the increase is fully offset by
doing less homework. Men's working
hours have remained roughly stable."
Samuelson's main contribution is bis
argument that we are the victims of a
revolution of rising expectations. The
prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s, says
Samuelson, was set against the memory
of the devastation of tbe Great Depres-
sion, and the austerity of the Second
World War and its subseqtient anxieties;
and it tmleashed a sense of exaggerated
optimism abotit the ftittire and abt)ut
government's ability to keep tis steady
and rising upwards with the aid of Key-
nt'sian economics and a confident new
tribe of economists. But there were
forces working the other way. The
economists' conspicuous failure to fine-
tune the economy and to eliminate
the scourge of recession, tbe emerging
trade-off between inflation and employ-
ment that made the earlier goal of a low-
unemployment economy yield to the
notion of the higher "natural" rate of
unemployment, and the slower growth
of GNP since the 1970s, in the post-()PK(;
era—all these phenomena contrasted
sharply with the immediate past of great
optimism, producing the exaggerateti
pessimism that afflicts tis today. We are
doing better, l)ut we are not doing as
well as we thought we would be doing.
For this reason, there is immoderate tin-
happiness where there shotild be moder-
ate happiness.
S amuelson also assigns asmall role in this compli-cated story to the indirecteffects of slow growth: less
growth implies less revenues, and less rev-
enues put a damper on tbe growth of
public spending on entitlement pro-
grams, even as the demands for such
expenditures increase sliarply. But Sam-
uelson does not see in slow gnnvth the
root of ail evil. By contrast, feffrey Mad-
rick's shallow hook is crippled not merely
by an titterly implausible technological
explanation of what has caused econom-
ic growth to be slow since the early 1970s,
but also by a simplistic stirrender to eco-
nomic determinism.
Madrick would have us believe that if
only growtli since the 1970s had been
higher, onr problems wottid have disap-
peared, (!l(>nsider this strange assertion:
"Otir health-care expenditures, our
fastest-growing major expense, would
bave been more affordable if we bad con-
tinued to grow at the historic [that is,
fasterl rate." This is good arithmetic, but
it is bad economics. Suppose that expen-
sive new technology is invented to attack
cardiovascular disease. GNP sbould grow
with this invention since growtli reflects
"fimdanientals" stich as capital accumtiia-
tion and technical change. But if the
healthcare system is set up in such a way
that most patients cannot be denied the
benefits of the best tecbnology. the in-
creased medical expendittires can otit-
strip substantially the greater economic
growth and revenues. Indeed, there is no
dispute that this is pardy what explains
the recent explosion in medical expendi-
tures.
Or consider, from Madrick's hook, this
outrageotis claim:
Slow fcniiomif growth may increasingly
sfl otd )K'iisit)iitrs against yotiiig workers,
homeowni'rs ajiaiii.st renters, stibtirbs
agaitist cities, natives against iinniigraiits,
ligtil-skitiiied Americans against daik-
NkJTinfd oTics, debiors against creditors, and
ihose with power, by virtue of iheir own
wt-alih or their paid represenlation in Wash-
JTigtoii, agahist those who have none.
Realty! Madrick's illusion tbat all bad
things go together is thir flip side of the
illusion, the old liberal illusion, that all
good things go together, and so we are in
danger of civil war, or civil wars.
m.
B tit all, as 1 say, is not well.In a survey last summerthat asked respondents tochoose between "the op-
porttmity to succeed" and "sectirity from
Tailing," 88 percent of tho.se 18 to 29
years old chose the former, a distinct
difference from the older generation's
response. This is inevitable, perhaps: the
young tend to seek opportunity, variety
and change, atid to dread the prospect
of being stuck iti lifetime jobs, wbile
older workers see difficulty in change
and seek continuity. Still, the latter
grotip's preference may well have been
accenttiated as the displacement rates
have increased for them and created a
more actite sense of insecurity. Indeed,
insecurity about johs may be properly
seen as increasing if people hegin to
feel, for good reasons (such as the
strong presence of foreign competition),
that the probability of holding onto jobs
has diminished even if few displace-
ments have actually occurred. So some-
thing has indeed changed. Tlie pessi-
mists are not entirely hallucinating. The
real wages of the tmskilled have fallen.
Tbe job insecurity of the skilled has iti-
creased, as their displacement rates have
risen.
But why are we ailing in this way?
There are two answers to the qtiestion
about catises, two schools of thought.
There are those who addtice domestic
factors such as technological change,
and those who blame the Global Age.
But the decline in teal wages is to be
explained, I believe, as overwhelmingly
the product of tuiskilled-labor-saWng
technological progress. We are down
the wrong track if we worry abotit the
global econtjmy—specifically, abotU tbe
increase of American trade witb. and
American investment in, developing
countries south of otir border and else-
where. And yet the qtiestion of job inse-
curity does have much to do with the
Global Age. Let me explain.
Consider the decline in the real wages
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of thf unskilled. The evidence that glob-
alisni—in the form of trade with, and
invt'stmcnt in. poor countrics^ — i^s ii sig-
iiillciint cause of this decline is not coni-
pt'llintr. Those who think otherwise do
not conic to ^rips witli a central tact: if
such trade is at the heart of the explana-
ti(»ii, then the import prices of the laboi-
in tensive goods should have fallen
lelative to those of other skilled-labor-
iisint^  goods. For that is the mechanism
by wliich, obviously, tlie pressure on real
wages of labor would arise. Btit all seri-
ous researchers now agree that this was
not the case in the iy80s. when the real
wages of unskilled labor felt in the
United States, hi fact, if yoti look at the
behavior of the prices of labor-intensive
goods in the 197()s, when real wages kept
rising, they actually fell. Thus, when
prices of labor-intensive goods were
falling (in the 197()s). real wages kept
rising; and wben they were rising, real
wages fell,
This is not as surprising as one might
think. Afier all, the inttiition that (ailing
jjrices of the goods that one produces
wilt net essarily prevent one from sharing
in the gains from trade sounds like com-
mon sense. Rnt, as Wolfgang Stolper and
Paul Sainiielson showed half a ceiittiry
ago, it takes heroic assumptions to turn
that intuition into an iron taw. Economic
theorists typically gain recognition by
proving a "possibility" theorem which
overttn-ns the notion that something is
improvable, oi" by proving an "impossi-
bitity" theorem which overturns the view
ttiat something may be possibte. The
Stolper-Samtielson theorem, that the
real wage of tabor coutd be shown neces-
sarily to fall when the price of labor-
intensive goods fell, belonged to the
lormer class; there were few economists
foi' whom ihe notion was anything more
than a ttieoretical curiosity.
O ne need not be aneconomist to grasp the ar-gument that falling pricesof labor-intensive goods
can increase the reat wage of tabor. Con-
sider that my wage at work fatls because
stioes, textites, toys, and other tabor-
intensive goods fati in price. But tben I
may atso be spending a tol of my income
to buy these goods, so that my gains as a
consiuner otitweigh my losses as a work-
ei. leaving my "real" wage and my eco-
nomic wetfare higher. As it happens,
working peopte do spend a mtich higher
portion of their btidgel on snch goods
than, say, an average reader ol this maga-
zine. Again, increased international com-
petitive pressure could snap oui iinlustry
into gieater efllciency, as the Japanese
(tid for Detroit: alt productive factors
ilicn profit from the increased efficiency.
I iicreased economies of scale in produc-
tion as freer trade expands markets could
also profit all factors. Indeed, modeting
the effects of NAI'IA in this fashion, the
economists Drtisitta Brown, Alan Dear-
dorff and Roliert Stern tiad catcutated
during the debate on NAHA that its pas-
sage woutd improve, not worsen, our
workers' real wages.
I should add that the popular night-
mare that our unskitted workers are
destined to be swamped by rapidty ex-
panding supplies of labor-intensive prod-
ucts, made in "gigaTitic" countries such
as Cbina and India, ignores two elemen-
tary facts. China and India are large; but
their economic size, which is the rete-
vant statistic, is not .so large. The United
States, on some estimates of national
income, is six times the size of India aiid
three times the size of Ctiina. A "large"
rate of growth of stippty in tlie poor
coiuitries can be absorbed wittiout dilFi-
cutty by a "smatl" rate of growtti of I'icli-
cotmtry demand. Besides, the wortd is a
continmmi of exporters and importers
of labor-intensive products, and cotin-
tries move from one role to another as
time passes and incomes change. Hence
there is no reason to think that expan-
sion of Chinese and Indian supply of
tabor-ill tensive goods witi necessaritv
take ptace in American markets, or for
that matter in the traditionally rich OEt:t)
country markets, exclusivcty.
Indeed, as the Atistralian economist
Rosstiarnaiit has shown, the ratio of net
exports to wortd imports of tabor-
intensive manufacttires has indeed risen
dramatically in the tast decade (from
negligible levets to roughly 14 percent)'
for (;hina, but it has simultaneousty and
symmetrically fallen (from abotit 14 per-
cent down to viittially zero by 1994) in
East Asia, so that the Chinese expatision
of siicti mantifacttires has been absorbed
during the I'JHOs mainly within the Asian
region itsetf, thus avoiding substantiat
pressure on structural adjustment in the
"old industrial countries." Aggregating
these cotmtries into a "Sotith" or an
"East" that wilt come at tis like gang-
busters is an ugly failacv that ignores bow
countries progress up a ladder in com-
paiative advantage.
Thus the argument about trade with
poor countries producing paupers in
our midst is hard to sustain empirically.
And so is the contention that investment
is atso such a source of the distress of our
unskitted. During the 1980s, the United
States received more direct foreign in-
vestment than it sent out. And if we look
at alt foreign investment as the flip side
of our current account deficit, then we
also received net investment. The con-
clusion is inescapable: economic integra-
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tion with ihe South does not lie at the
eoie of the diffirulty facing our un-
skilled; and tlie obvious < ul|ti it then h;is
to be unskilled-labot-saviiii^ technologi-
eal c.han<^ e.
Bui isn't this tet hnological change
itsell prompted by global eonipetition?
Some analysts, such as Ethan Kiipsteiii,
think so, but they are wrong. If global
integration with the South is driving
wages down, tlien the resulting tecbno-
logieal change should be l)iase<l loward
increasing the use of tlie eheajier liibor.
What we see is ihe ojjposile. Ibe ten-
dency of leclinological ihaiige is to
diminisb (he leliaiue on cheaper laljor.
I ain not suggesting that the(ilolwl Age makes no dif'lei-cucc in oin' economic life.Quite tbe contrary. The Glo-
bal Age is increasingly, and in a system-
atic and systemic fashion, beginning to
change the landscape in a way that con-
tribtites to job insecurity. We bave to
reckon with what is popularly described
as increased Ibreign competition. More
precisely, wbat we are ia(iiig now is a
new and steadily encroaebing economic
tmiverse in wbich tlie nature ol compar-
ative advantage is becoming ihin, vol-
atile, kaleidoscopic and creating vulnei a-
bilities for inthistries, firms and workers,
in world trade and world investment,
there are now greater transactions and
greater Hows. Tracie in goods and ser-
vices bas continued to grow faster rela-
tive to national hiconies throughout tbe
postwar period. More pertinently, tlie
sbare of trade within the (htigely trad-
able) merchandise and primary goods
sectors has grown perceptibly, compared
to the prewar and tbe immediate post-
war levels. By the 198()s, as (be economic
historian Douglas hwin has noted, there
was a vast increase in the expostire oi
tradable industries to international com-
petition: a situation that was more true
of primary industries in tbe prewar per-
iod but now characterizes most manufac-
tures today. The substantial exposure to
international competition, the fact that
few industries toclay can pretend that
they are innntme from international
competition: this reality is making itself
more and more keenly ic'lt.
The contintiing integration of the
world's financial markets, the increased
transnationalization of production by
multinationals, and tbe convergence in
technological ability among the OF(^ l)
cotintries. have all combined to make
competition among llrms across nations
fierce. (A)mpanies in different countries
can avail themselves of similar tet hnolo-
gies, borrow at similar intei est rates and
prodtice where it pays a little more to do
so, in a manner which was difficult only a
decade ago. The margins of competitive
advantage bave, therefore, become thin-
ner: a small shift in eosts somewhere can
now be deadly to yotu' competitiveness.
We used to call sticli indtistries "foot-
loose"'; the ability to hold on to them was
fiagile, as the "buffei"." or margin of com-
petitive a<!van(age, was not substantial.
In the old days, few considered stieli
indtistries to lie the norm. Today they
are the norm.
There is no better proof of tbis sense
of increased vtilnerability in internation-
al competition, reflecting what 1 have
called the 'kaleidoscopic comparative
advantag<'"' of the (ilobal Age. tlian tbe
fact that firms (the managements and
the workers) are increasingly tetnpted to
look over their foreign rivals' shotilders
to see if differences in (heir d(jmestic
policies and theii' domestic institutions
are giving tliein tlial extra edge JTI com-
petition wbich then amouTits lo "unfair
trade." This growing pei'ceptioii of the
new volatility of economic advantage also
animates all the "fair trade" demands to
harmoni/e the instittitions and the poli-
cies of other cotintries with the institti-
tions and tbe policies of our own. so as to
impose "etiual l)urdens" and to "level tbe
playing field," and the lobbying to laise
environmental and lal.»or standards in
de\e!oj)ing countries, an<l our continu-
ing "system friction" with Japan.
Increased international competition. 1
suspect, also explains to a degree the ten-
dency to displace older, edticated work-
ers, and bente also the general rise in
docmneiited displacement lates (hiring
1980 to 1993. The decision to let these
workers go, in favor of younger edtu ated
workers, may have to do with technical
change to wbich tbe older generation
has not adapted. But there is also a more
subtle reason whv firms let such people
go. Ibis is the labor-market theory that
explains why lirnis rationally piefer
wages below productivity early in an em-
ployee's tentire. and wages above pro-
ductivity later in that employee's tentue:
it encoui ages workers to stay at the firm,
minimi/ing voluntary C|iiits. But then the
only ihing that prevents a lirm frotn lir-
ing its senior woikers, tlins collecting
wiiat econoinists call "rent" (it is better
described as a ri[)-off') from these work-
ers, is sinijjly tlie "rej)iilation costs" that
would stigmati/.e ihe firm as an tinreli-
able employer tbat cheats yotiotit of your
greater-than-yoiu-current-productivity
wages in tbe later years. The loss in repu-
tation if the firm cheats is wbat prevents
it Iroin breaking tins "implicit ct)ntract"
between it and its employees; btit if a firm
Can say, "I would love to keep you. but
international competition leaves me w"ith
no (hoice btit to lire yoti," it may keep its
reputation intact. Yet this phenomenon
may not last long, as workers increasing-
ly seek to negotiate explicit contracts to
avoid this unpleasaTit outcome.
IV.
T he presstire on wages atthe bottom is overwhelm-ingly due to domestic tet h-nological ehange. and thejob insecuritv in tbe middle and at the
top is primarily dne to tbe Global Age.
('learly we need a far-seeing, unpan-
icked intellecttial and instittttional re-
sponse to these new circtmistances. And
such a response is precisely what we ai e
not getting. Instead we have tbe lam-
pant delusions ol isolationism and intru-
sion ism.
The isolationists come in a few vari-
eties. There is, of cotirse, Patrick Bitchan-
an. His prc-sei iption, wlu-n it is not siinjilv
an appeal to nativist picjudice. is that we
withdraw fioin ihe exteTiial lineal and
hide behind piotection. even at otii'own
economic expense. The "moderate" pro-
tectionists do not like nativist politics
(thotigh they are not above the politics of
resentment); they wotitd like to halt the
further fi'eeing of trade with poor cotin-
tries, in the spirit of James tioldsmith's
stiggestion that we practice free trade
only with "like-wage" countries so as to
protect (he wages of otir workers. Tbe
"extreme" protectionists wotiid like to
unravel even existing trade treaties, siicli
as NAFiA. Moderately or extremely, tbey
pnjpose that we close the door to freer
trade with poor cotintries. denying them
and otirselves the certain benefits of a
more open economy.
If you are a great power, another re-
sponse is available to yoti, tbe one i call
intrusionism. Interest groups concerned
abotit competitiveness may get the Amer-
ican govertnneni to cajole, bamboo/le,
Ol' pmiisli odier nations into adopting
po!i( ies lliat limit tbe competition that is
the glory of the (ilobal Age. Ibis may
not work too well when we fac e off
against other rich and powerful coun-
tries: our attempts to force )apan into
abandoning its institutional structtires
have generally failed, except wlien do-
mestic forces within Japan already
leaned iti the desired direction. When
we face the poor cotintries of the South,
however, we can speak less softly and
carry a bigger stick. And we can mobilize
as otir allies the other rich nations tbat
share our objective. Thus, we have wit-
nessed tbe recent growth of "tmfair
trade" demands addressed to the poor
nations, including tbe establishment and
increase of inlnimum wages: this would
raise the pixxliiction costs of our rivals in
these poor countries to levels (hat make
tbeir competition more tolerable.
Intrtisionisin is no less of a chimera
than isolationism. It seeks to restrain
trade, but from the other end: it is tanta-
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mount to "export prolccUoiii,sm." The
[HOIJICIU i.s that the loolislmfss of intru-
sionisni is less transparent, fhis is partly
htxause tho.se couccrnt'tl with rompfti-
li\en('ss are oftf ii allied witli i^roups tluit
SL'ck to advatice thf Ic^itiiiiatc, moral
agendas that set u.s ajiatt from many
other nations. The latter ji;n>ii|)s ])iTliaps
act on John Stttai'l Mill's icniark ihat no
great catise was advanced without some-
one's special interest being mixed up in
it. But they are wrong.
For the anti-compt'tilion lolibies liavc
weakened the moral agenda hy seler-
(i\<'ly tilting ii against the poor nalioiis
;IIH1 shiclriiiig tlie rich nations, and hy
linkintr ii cioselv to trade access instead
oi afhancing it in other ways that are
more eflective. Thus, our demands for a
"social clause" at the World Trade Orga-
nization, making conforinitv to it a prc-
eontUtion for market access, have been
rechieed to an emasculated "core." The
Tit^ lu to imionize and to bargain collec-
tively is included—l)ut then uliy omit
strictines on the restrictions on second-
ary boycotts and on the practice of hir-
ing replacement workers, both of whieh
< an cripple the strikes of workers and
have helped reduce Atneiican unions to
a membeiship olless than 11^  percent of
the workfoR-f? Again, there is nothing
abont sweatshops, rampant in our gar-
ment manuhu ture, or about the rights
of" migrant workers, who are often sub-
ject to abject af)use here, if investigative
television reports are to be believed. The
heavy hand of "export protectioni.sm" is
all too manifest here. And it arouses
strong objections from poor coimtries,
who suspect that the (linton administia-
tion is disgnising American interests as
American \alues.
T hose values are better ad-vanced instead by the polit-ical and financial supportof the ntmieions and grow-
ing N(XXs, both here and abroad, that
work ceaselessly to nudge the world in
the I iglu directioti. Appropi iate interna-
tional institutions stich as the ILO on
labor rights, and the i NICFF on rights in
the C^onvention of the Child, could be
assigned to prodtice systematic and peri-
odic reviews of member states' eotiibr-
miiy to these conventions. This in turn
might enable govet nments to use public
censure, and NdOs to use campaigns,
labeling and boycotts (t) shame and pres-
sure firms and nations, both poor and
rich symmetrically, to change their
offending ways. Used in this way, today's
"eivil society" can be a very powerftil
instrument of change. But the Clinton
administration, whose public silence
over China's egregious \iolations of hu-
tnan rights is deplorable, has etiibraced
intiiisionisin, instead in the shape of
the social clattse—a bone thrown to the
unions in an abandonment of genuine
commitment to the cause of human
rights, and a snrrendei to export protec-
tionism.
fi'adc is not the catise of declinitig
real wages; it likely improves them. The
I.uddite solution to the pTdblems of
the unskilled is siirtilarly Hawed. (Stich a
solution has been brilliantly debunked
by Steven Marcus in these pages.) The
sohition to the economic piobletn that
is distressing us has to lie. I'ather, in a
domestic instittitional i espouse: in more
and different governmetital action and
arehitecture, designed so that we can
profit less painfully Irom the new age.
The political scientist [ohn Ruggie wiotc
in 1982 ol what he called "embedded
liberalistn." arguitig that the New Deal
had embedded liberalism oiihe market-
place into the "social order," tiiaking it
toleiable and stii vivable. The satiie argti-
ment, Rtiggie stiggested, could be ex-
tended to the integration of nations into
the world economy.
The fitix and adjustment costs seen to
be im]K)sed by forces beyond the nation-
state create a particularly acute dcMuand
for state relief. The cotiitnttnitarian le-
gitimacy of such relief is plain. 1 ha\e
long argued foi" the ci'cation of institu-
tional support mechanisms to ease the
consequences of, and hence to facili-
tate, the decline and the exit of tirm.s in
the context ol a vastly more integtatc^d
world economy; the tnost cotnpelling
such instittition would be the ptovision
of adjtistment assistance. Robert Reich,
along those lines, lias insisted on work-
ers' retraining and educational upgrad-
ing. In a time of accelerating techno-
logical advancement, enhaticing the ac-
qtiisiticm of skills throtigh educational
leforms, including votichers, is the right
kind of thinking.
Moi'eover, in a world in which we now
have fewer atid possibly vanishing jobs
with the coLiventional probability of long
tenure, we need to break the tight and
tiiTie-honored linkages between employ-
ment and the benefits that provide basic
needs. This problem is especially acute
in OUI" pix)vision of health care, which
has been tied to employtnent by a cjtiirk
of wartime. As long-held jobs become
scarcer, however, yoimg workers also
need to becotrie more adept at the at t of
planning their fitttire, since pensions
and other benefits in the package tradi-
tionally provided by one's long-term em-
ployers have also become increasing-
ly rare. One is now more likely to plan
tor ix'tirement on one's own.
Institutions often e\'oh'e in lesponse
to needs. Btit will they evolve without the
state steering in the necessary direction?
And, even then, will they evolve fast
enotigh? Only a romantic belief in the
virtue of laisse/ faire, and a cynical disbe-
lief in the capacity of useful state action,
can lead one to answer these questions
in the afllrmative. Besides, a state tliat
stands aside as societ\- is a state that is
liobbling itself. It is also a careless and
( allous state, lacking in the empathy that
has been a historical characteristic of
otir essentially getiet ous society. We tiitisr
not cast doubt upon the legititiiacy, and
the tiecessity, of state action. We mtist
remember what the triarket-only liber-
tarians amutig the Republic ans have
forgotten: that extending a h;uid, even
bearing a lew gifts, to the |)oor, and
more genetally to the vietitns of social
and economic dislocation, is not merely
good for the soul. It is also good for the
polity. The Global Age is no titne for
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